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STUDENT COMMENTS
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INDIAN NUCLEAR
DEVELOPMENT
On May 18, 1974, India detonated a nuclear explosive device
in the desert area of Rajasthan, about forty miles from the Indo-
Pakistani border. This development has caused grave concern not
only among India's neighbors, but also among many other nations of
the world.' It is the purpose of this comment to assess the legality of
India's actions under present standards of international law. In so
doing it shall be necessary to examine: 1) the status of nuclear non-
proliferation as an international legal norm, 2) other principles of
international law that are applicable to India's nuclear explosion, 3)
the Indian position on the legality of the development of nuclear
explosive devices by non-nuclear weapon states, and 4) conclusions
regarding the legality of India's actions and their impact upon the
international legal system.
I. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AS AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORM
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty2 entered into force on
March 5, 1970. The treaty represents the most advanced and com-
prehensive attempt yet made to control the spread of nuclear weap-
ons.
The obligations of the treaty are divided between two categories
of states: nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states.'
Nuclear weapon states are prohibited from transferring "to any recip-
ient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." 5
They are also bound not to assist or encourage any non-nuclear
weapon state from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring such de-
1. See 27 PAKISTAN AFFAIRS No. 11, June 1, 1974, at 3; Id. No. 12, June 16, 1974,
at 2; Id. No. 13, July 1, 1974, at 2; Id. No. 14, July 16, 1974, at 3.
2. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done July 1, 1968, 21
U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839 [hereinafter cited as NPT].
3. The treaty entered into force with 97 signatures and 47 ratifications. Smith,
NA TO Nuclear Information Sharing Arrangements and the Non-Proliferation Treaty:
Collective Defense Confronts Arms Control, 13 ATowc ENERGY L.J. 331, 341 (1972).
As of January 1, 1974, ratifications, accessions, or notifications of successions had been
deposited by 82 states. TREATIES IN FORCE, Jan. 1, 1974, at 366.
4. Under the treaty, "a nuclear weapon State is one which has manufactured and
exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967."
NPT, art. IX, para. 3.
5. Id. art. I.
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vices.6 In addition to these two specific prohibitions, nuclear weapon
states are generally obligated to facilitate the development of nuclear
energy throughout the third world' and to make available to the non-
nuclear weapon states "the potential benefits from any peaceful ap-
plications of nuclear explosions." ' Finally, nuclear weapon states are
obligated to negotiate in good faith on measures designed to end the
nuclear arms race with the eventual goal of complete disarmament.,
In contrast, the non-nuclear weapon states-are bound not only
to refrain from acquiring or manufacturing nuclear explosive de-
vices,10 but also to accept international safeguards and controls on
their peaceful nuclear programs." The requirement is designed to
prevent the diversion of source or special fissionable material to the
manufacturing of a nuclear explosive device. Under the treaty the
safeguards are to be administered by the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency (IAEA)."
Thus, India's actions as a non-nuclear weapon state were clearly
violative of the two most critical provisions of the treaty: 1) the prohi-
bition against the fabrication of a nuclear explosive device, and 2) the
application of international controls to peaceful nuclear programs.'
3
6. Id. The Non-Proliferation Treaty makes no distinction between nuclear weap-
ons and "peaceful" nuclear explosives. From a technological point of view there is no
meaningful difference between a bomb and a "plowshare" device. In order for the Non-
Proliferation Treaty to be effective, therefore, controls must be applied to all nuclear
explosive devices. M. WILLRICH, NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR
ARMS CONTROL 69-70 (1969); Firmage, The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 711, 722 (1969); Bunn, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
1968 Wis. L. Rxv. 766, 772; 27 PAKISTAN AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 3. See generally,
Gorove, Distinguishing "Peaceful" from "Military" Uses of Atomic Energy, Some
Facts and Considerations, 30 O.S.L.J. 495 (1969).
7. NPT, art. IV, para. 2. The obligation to aid the nuclear development of the
third world also applies to advanced non-nuclear weapon states such as Canada.
8. Id. art. V.
9. Id. art. VI.
10. Id. art. II.
11. Id. art. Ill.
12. Id. See generally Questor, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency, 24 INT'L ORG. 163 (1970). The treaty does not set forth
specific safeguard requirements. It merely requires that non-nuclear weapon states
conclude safeguard agreements with the IAEA. The agreements must be designed so
as to provide effective monitoring of the use and production of source (natural ura-
nium) or special fissionable material (enriched uranium).
13. India has consistently resisted international controls over the peaceful nuclear
programs of the non-nuclear weapon states. In the Indian view:
Institution of international controls on peaceful reactors and power sta-
tions is like an attempt to maintain law and order in a society by placing
all its law-abiding citizens in custody while leaving its law-breaking ele-
ments free to roam the streets.
INDIAN NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT
Since India has never signed or ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
the legality of India's nuclear explosion hinges on whether the Non-
Proliferation Treaty represents customary international law to such
an extent that its provisions are binding even upon states that are not
a party to the treaty.
Treaties, especially multilateral treaties, are commonly cited by
writers, judges, and lawyers as evidence of customary international
law. 4 A treaty may be either declaratory of customary international
law as it already exists, or it may, in itself, be the formulation (fons
et origo) of a new legal norm.' 5 The validity of a declaratory treaty
as evidence of customary international law can be tested by examin-
ing the practice of states prior to the formulation of the treaty. Con-
versely, a treaty which attempts to create a new legal norm must
achieve a high level of adherence before that norm can be considered
a part of customary international law. The Non-Proliferation Treaty
deals with an uncertain area of international law and thus contains
elements of both types of treaties. It is necessary, therefore, to exam-
ine both state practice prior to the formulation of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty and the degree of adherence to the treaty.
Also, the subject matter of a treaty has a significant effect upon
how quickly that treaty becomes a part of customary international
law. Accordingly, the purposes of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and
the motives of its chief proponents, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. must
be considered.
A. State Practice
State practice as evidence of customary international law in the
area of nuclear non-proliferation must be weighed carefully. The de-
cision to go nuclear has been in the past and, for the foreseable future,
will be a decision that is based upon economic, military, and political
factors rather than upon legal analysis. The practice of the large
majority of nations which have no nuclear capability whatsoever
must be discounted accordingly. Nevertheless, state practice before
and after the Non-Proliferation Treaty came into force indicates that
there may be an emerging norm of international law against the
development of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear weapon states. The
practice has generally taken the form of 1) unilateral declarations, 2)
Statement by the Representative of India to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Con-
ference, Aug. 12, 1965, ENDC/PV. 223, at 5-21; quoted in M. WILLRICH, supra note 6,
at 124.
14. On multilateral treaties as sources of international law, see W. COPLIN, THE
FUNCTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 8-10 (1966); Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evi-
dence of Customary International Law, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 275 (1965-66).
15. Baxter, supra note 14, at 277.
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the de-nuclearization of certain geographic areas, and 3) limitations
upon the testing of nuclear weapons."
1. Unilateral Declarations
The most significant renunciations of the right to manufacture
nuclear weapons have been made by West Germany and India. The
West German pledge was made in connection with that country's
entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1954.17 The
pledge, however, prohibits only the manufacturing of nuclear weap-
ons. It does not prevent their acquisition by other methods. Also, the
continued legal validity of the pledge has been open to question in
recent years.'8
The Indian renuncation of nuclear weapons has taken the form
of general pronouncements by various government leaders.19 The pri-
mary thrust of these statements is that India will develop nuclear
energy for exclusively peaceful purposes. It is true, however, that such
promises cannot be taken as irrevocable commitments that are le-
gally binding upon future Indian governments." Also, India makes a
distinction between peaceful nuclear explosives and nuclear weapons,
a distinction not generally made by the great majority of nations.'
Nevertheless, India's declarations had created expectations among
the nations of the world and to ignore these expectations is a serious
breach of trust, if not of international law, by India.2
2. Nuclear Free Zones
Another important development in the area of nuclear non-
proliferation has been the emergence of "nuclear free zones." The
zones have been created by multilateral treaties which have received
widespread support. The first such area was created by the Antarctic
16. See generally M. WIuLLICH, supra note 6, at 53-66; G. DELCOIGNE & G. RUBIN-
STEIN, NON-PROLIFERATION DES ARMES NucLEAIRES ET SYSTEMES DE CONTROLE 57-80
(1970).
17. M. WILLRiCH, supra note 6, at 53.
18. Id. See also Willrich, West Germany's Pledge Not to Manufacture Nuclear
Weapons, 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 91 (1966).
19. See India News, June 14, 1974, at 3, col. I for comments on the development
of nuclear weapons by Prime Minister Nehru (1957), President Prasad (1958), Prime
Minister Shastri (1964), and Prime Minister Gandhi (1968). See also STOCKHOLM IN-
TERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE NEAR-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES AND THE NPT
22-23 (1972); S. WILLIAMS, THE U.S., INDIA AND THE BOMB 39 (1969).
20. Kapur, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Foreign Policy: A Perspective, 27 WORLD
TODAY 379, 380-81 (1971).
21. India insists that its development of a nuclear explosive device is for peaceful
purposes and therefore cannot be considered a weapon. India News, June 14, 1974, at
3, col. 3. Most countries contend that given the state of nuclear technology no such
distinction can reasonably be made. See note 6 supra.
22. Wall Street Journal, May 31, 1974, at 10, col. 2.
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Treaty of 1959 which prohibited all nuclear explosions in that re-
gion.2 3 A second nuclear free zone was established by the Treaty
Governing the Use and Exploration of Outer Space, which entered
into force in 1967. The treaty prohibits the placement of nuclear
weapons in orbit around the earth, on celestial bodies, or on space
stations. The third nuclear free zone was created by the Treaty
Prohibiting the Placement of Nuclear Weapons or Other Weapons of
Mass Destruction on the Seabed. 5 The treaty entered into force in
1972 and differs from the other two treaties in that it was specifically
designed as an arms control agreement.
Each of the three multilateral treaties deals with areas generally
considered to be international in character. They represent the joint
efforts of the two countries who have the technology and resources to
carry out nuclear activities, the United States and the Soviet Union.
The almost universal acceptance of the three treaties by nuclear and
non-nuclear weapon states alike has probably already elevated the
treaties to the status of customary international law.
There have also been significant attempts to create nuclear free
zones in Latin America and Africa. The Latin American effort can
be traced to a working resolution concerning the de-nuclearization of
Latin America that was introduced in the United Nations General
Assembly by Chile, Bolivia, Brazil, and Ecuador in 1962.6 Following
a General Assembly resolution endorsing the de-nuclearization of
Latin America,2 negotiations among the Latin American states pro-
duced the Treaty of Tlatelolco which was opened for signature on
February 14, 1967.2s The provisions of this treaty are stricter than
those of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in that the parties to the Treaty
of Tlatelolco may not permit the deployment of nuclear weapons by
other states on their territory. Also, parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco
may not aid any other state (nuclear weapon state or non-nuclear
23. The Antarctic Treaty, art. V, para. 1 [19611 1 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780,
402 U.N.T.S. 71 (1961). See also G. DELCOIGNE, supra note 16, at 61-63.
24. Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, done Jan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347. See also, G. DELCOIGNE, supra note 16, at 63-
64; M. WILLRCH, supra note 6, at 57.
25. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, done Feb. 11, 1971,
23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337. See also G. DELCOIGNE, supra note 16, at 64-65.
26. G. DELCOIGNE, supra note 16, at 58.
27. G.A. Res. 1911, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, at 14, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963).
28. G. DELCOIGNE, supra note 16, at 59. As of 1970, the treaty had been signed by
22 states and ratified by 15. Id. at 183-84. The text of the Treaty of Tlatelolco may be
found in 22 U.S.T. 762, T.I.A.S. No. 7137.
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weapon state) in the manufacturing of nuclear weapons."9 The Non-
Proliferation Treaty permits the deployment of nuclear weapons on
the territory of non-nuclear weapon states and allows a non-nuclear
weapon state to aid a nuclear weapon state in the manufacturing of
nuclear weapons. 0
The provisions under which the Treaty of Tlatelolco will come
into force, however, are almost impossible to fulfill.3 The treaty can-
not enter into force for the entire zone until it is ratified by all states
of the region.32 Similarly, the treaty cannot enter into force until all
nuclear weapon states ratify Protocol II, whereby these states pledge
not to use nuclear weapons against parties to the treaty nor to encour-
age or participate in any violation of the treaty. 31
The Treaty of Tlatelolco, however, recognizes that signatory
states "have the imprescriptable right to waive, wholly or in part,"
the conditions under which the treaty comes into force.34 Fourteen
states of Latin America have exercised this right and for these states
the treaty is now in force.3 5
Efforts have also been made to create a nuclear free zone in
Africa. At first, these efforts centered around African concern over
French nuclear testing in the Sahara desert.3 6 With the passing of
French Algeria, the focus moved toward a general de-nuclearization
of Africa. As a result, two resolutions were passed by the United
Nations General Assembly which called upon all states to respect
Africa as a nuclear free zone. 3 Despite these efforts, no further prog-
29. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 28, art. I.
30. M. WILLRICH, supra note 6, at 57; G. FISCHER, THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS 60 (1971).
31. M. WILLRICH, supra note 6, at 56. The conditions under which the Treaty of
Tlatelolco takes effect are set forth in Article 28 of the treaty.
32. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 28, art. XXVIII, para. la. The requirement
that ratifications of the treaty be unanimous implicitly acknowledges that the treaty
cannot be imposed as customary international law upon non-consenting states.
33. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 28, art. XXVIII. The treaty defines a nuclear
weapon as "any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled
manner and which has a group of characteristics that are appropriate for use for
warlike purposes." Id. art. V. Under this definition India's device is a nuclear weapon.
India, therefore, must sign Protocol II before the treaty can come into force.
34. Id. art. XXVIII, para. 2.
35. G. DELCOIGNE, supra note 16, at 183-84.
36. Id. at 59.
37. Id. at 59-60, 161-162. The resolutions are G.A. Res. 1652, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp.
17, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961) and G.A. Res. 2033, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 9,
U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965). The former resolution passed by a vote of 55-0 with 44
abstentions. The latter resolution also passed without opposition, 105-0, with 3 absten-
tions. The change in the voting pattern reflects the change in attitude of the United
States and the Soviet Union with respect to nuclear non-proliferation. G. DELCOIGNE,
supra note 16, at 60-61.
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ress has been made toward the de-nuclearization of Africa. The fail-
ure probably reflects African concern over the policies of the Union
of South Africa in regard to nuclear non-proliferation.
3 8
3. Limited Test Ban Treaty
A final element of state practice in regard to nuclear non-
proliferation is the Limited Test Ban Treaty. 39 Although the treaty
is primarily an arms control measure with environmental overtones,
it has served to restrain the proliferation of nuclear weapons by mak-
ing their development much more costly. 0 The treaty is also signifi-
cant because, unlike the outer space and seabed treaties, it is applica-
ble to several states who have the capability and motivation to con-
duct the proscribed activities. The inability of the international legal
system to prevent French defiance of the treaty indicates the necess-
ity of complete adherence to such treaties. In this respect, Indian
disregard of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is analogous to French vio-
lations of the Limited Test Ban Treaty.
B. Adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
The Non-Proliferation Treaty can be traced to a United Nations
General Assembly resolution on the "Prevention of the Wider Dis-
semination of Nuclear Weapons" which was unanimously adopted on
December 4, 1961. 41 After several years of U.Si-U.S.S.R. negotia-
tions under the auspices of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Con-
ference, the final draft of the treaty was presented to the General
Assembly for consideration. The Assembly approved the treaty on
June 12, 1968 by a vote of 95 to 4, with 21 abstentions. 43 The treaty
was opened for signature on July 1, 1968 and entered into force on
March 5, 1970 with 97 signatures and 47 ratifications.4 4 At the present
time 82 states have acceded to or ratified the treaty.45 To date, only
India has violated the treaty's ban on the manufacturing of nuclear
explosives by a non-nuclear weapon state. The widespread accept-
ance of the treaty must be considered persuasive evidence that the
38. The Union of South Africa has not ratified or acceded to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. TREATIES IN FORCE, Jan. 1, 1974, at 366.
39. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space
and Under Water, done Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S.
43.
40. M. WILLRICH, supra note 6, at 55.
41. Id. at 61.
42. For a legislative history of the treaty see M. WLLRCH, supra note 6, at 61-66;
PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF NucLEAR WEAPONS 52-62 (C.F. BARNABY ed. 1969).
43. G.A. Res. 2373, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16A, at 5-7, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1968).
44. See note 3, supra.
45. TREATIES IN FORCE, Jan. 1, 1974, at 366.
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treaty has attained at least some measure of independent juridical
status as customary international law.
Many of the non-adherents to the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
however, are those nations which have the technology and resources
to go nuclear in a relatively short period of time. Countries such as
Brazil, India, Japan, South Africa, Pakistan, West Germany, Egypt,
and Israel have refused to give up their nuclear option by ratifying
the Non-Proliferation Treaty." The People's Republic of China and
France have not become parties to the treaty, although both have
indicated that they will abide by its general terms. 7 Since the success
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is dependent upon near unanimous
adherence to its provisions, the practice of these states is crucial. The
decision of India to exercise its nuclear option will put political pres-
sure on other states, particularly Pakistan, to go nuclear. At the same
time, India's actions have made it easier for other states to argue in
favor of the legality of the development of nuclear explosives by non-
nuclear weapon states. India's nuclear blast is therefore a serious
blow to the formation of nuclear non-proliferation as a norm of cus-
tomary international law.
C. Purposes of the Treaty
Humanitarian treaties, because of their universal nature, be-
come norms of customary international law more quickly than do
those treaties which are based upon political or economic bartering.'"
Although the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is certainly benefi-
cial to all mankind, it would appear that the driving force behind the
Non-Proliferation Treaty was primarily political and not humanitar-
ian. The main proponents of the treaty, the United States and the
Soviet Union, see the treaty as a means of freezing the nuclear status
quo." The failure of the United States and the Soviet Union to reach
meaningful agreement on disarmament measures brings into ques-
tion their motives in proposing the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is
unlikely, therefore, that the near-nuclear states that are not parties
to the Non-Proliferation Treaty will feel bound by its provisions as
long as the expansion of nuclear arsenals by the nuclear weapon
states continues.
II. OTHER PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
In addition to arguments based upon a general legal norm
46. Id.
47. Smith, supra note 3, at 341-42 n. 40.
48. Baxter, supra note 14, at 286.
49. G. FISCHER, supra note 30, at 67; Ehrlich, The Non-Proliferation Treaty and
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosives, 56 VA. L. REv. 587, 588-89 (1970).
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against nuclear proliferation, India's nuclear explosion has been at-
tacked on several other grounds. It has been suggested that India: 1)
violated bilateral agreements with Canada concerning nuclear aid, 2)
violated the Limited Test Ban Treaty by allowing radioactive fallout
to enter Pakistan, and 3) disregarded universal humanitarian princi-
ples by expending large amounts of money on nuclear explosives
while a great number of Indians live in poverty.
A. Canadian Agreements
Canada has been the most important contributor of foreign aid
toward the development of Indian nuclear technology. The agree-
ments under which this aid was made available to India were con-
cluded several years prior to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. They do
not provide for strict controls over Canadian supplied materials.
India has merely agreed that the materials shall be used for exclu-
sively peaceful purposes.5
India asserts that it has not violated the aid agreements for two
reasons: 1) the materials used for the nuclear explosive device were
completely indigenous, 51 and 2) the explosion was conducted for
peaceful purposes. While it is technically correct that the materials
for the device were totally indigenous, the plutonium used in the
blast was produced by CIRUS, a 40 megawatt research reactor jointly
built by Canada and India. 52 Also, it is indisputable that India was
aware of Canada's position that there is no difference between a
nuclear explosive device and a nuclear weapon. 3 Canada's position
was made clear in a letter from Prime Minister Trudeau to Prime
Minister Gandhi:
The use of Canadian supplied material, equipment and facilities in
India that is at CIRUS, RAPP I and RAPP II or missile material from
these factories, for the development of a nuclear explosive device would
inevitably call on our part for a reassessment of our nuclear co-operation
arrangement with India, a position we would take with any other non-
50. Sullivan, Indian Attitudes on International Atomic Energy Controls, 43
PAcInc AFFAIRS 353, 358 (1970); See generally, Gorove, Control over Atoms-for-Peace
under Canadian Bilateral Agreements with other Nations, 42 DENVER L. CEN. J. 41
(1965).
51. Press Release No. 5/74, Information Service of India, May 21, 1974, at 3; Press
Release No. 7/74, Information Service of India, May 31, 1974, at 1; Press Release No.
8/74, Information Service of India, June 17, 1974, at 2 (text of Ambassador Kaul's
address to the National Press Club); Id. at 5 (text of the question and answer session
following Ambassador Kaul's speech).
52. NEWSWEEK, June 10, 1974, at 45.
53. See the remarks of Canadian Foreign Minister Mitchell Sharp reprinted in
FOREIGN AFFAIRS PAKISTAN at 38-40 (unpublished material available from the Embassy
of Pakistan).
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nuclear weapons State with which we have co-operation arrangements in
the nuclear field.
There is, of course, the possibility (contemplated in the Non-
Proliferation Treaty) that arrangements acceptable to the international
community will be developed for the provision of peaceful nuclear explo-
sive devices. In such an event we would of course have no cause for
concern if such service (without the transfer of technology relating to the
nuclear explosive device itself) were made available to India by existing
nuclear weapons States using their own nuclear material or plutonium
provided by India for this purpose.'
Prime Minister Gandhi's reply evaded the issue of nuclear explosive
devices by stating:
The obligations undertaken by our two Governments are mutual and they
cannot be unilaterally varied. In these circumstances it should not be
necessary now in our view to interpret these agreements in a particular
way based on the development of a hypothetical contingency.5
Nevertheless, the beginnings of this "hypothetical contingency" oc-
curred less than a year later when, in the summer of 1972, Mrs.
Gandhi ordered scientists to begin work on India's first nuclear explo-
sive device. 51 It must be concluded, therefore, that India has at least
violated the spirit, if not the letter of the agreements with Canada.
This evaluation is borne out by Canada's swift suspension of nuclear
aid to India following the detonation of India's nuclear device."
B. Limited Test Ban Treaty
The Limited Test Ban Treaty, to which India is a party, prohib-
its underground nuclear tests that would cause "radioactive debris to
be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose
jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted."58 India claims
that the test was "clean" and that no radioactivity was detected by
a helicoptor flying 100 feet above ground zero thirty minutes after the
blast.59 The assertion has been challenged by Pakistan and United
States intelligence sources. 0 Thus, the facts are in dispute. However,
even if it could be conclusively shown that India had violated the
Limited Test Ban Treaty in this instance, such a result would not bar
India from detonating other nuclear explosive devices. Only if India
54. Id. at 41-42.
55. Id.
56. NEWSWEEK, supra note 52, at 42.
57. FOREIGN AFFAIRS PAKISTAN, supra note 53, at 38; New York Times, May 21,
1974, at 1, col. 2; Id. May 23, 1974, at 1, col. 4.
58. Limited Test Ban Treaty, supra note 39, art. I, para. 1.
59. NEWSWEEK, supra note 52, at 45; Press Release No. 7/74, supra note 46, at 1-
3.
60. FOREIGN AFFAIRS PAKISTAN, supra note 53, at 56; 27 PAKISTAN AFFAIRS No. 12,
supra note 1, at 4; NEWSWEEK, supra note 52, at 45.
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were unable to provide adequate safeguards against radiation leakage
would the Limited Test Ban Treaty be a significant legal deterrent
to India's development of nuclear explosive devices.
C. Humanitarian Principles
The humanitarian argument against the Indian nuclear blast is
based upon the incongruity of developing nuclear explosives in a
nation that has so many economic and social problems." Translated
into legal terms, the argument would require that a nation expend its
resources to fulfill the basic human needs of its populace before any
of those resources could be allocated to other areas. Although human-
itarian principles of international law have made great progress in the
past few years, a norm governing the expenditure of internal re-
sources has not yet emerged. The concept is too far-reaching in that
it would prevent a nation from allocating its resources to those pro-
jects which that nation, through its own decision making process,
concludes must be undertaken. The level of military expenditures in
the world is ample proof that such a norm of customary international
law does not exist.
The argument is particularly weak when it is applied to India's
nuclear program. India spends only about one percent of its national
budget on nuclear research. The cost of developing the nuclear explo-
sive was less than $400,000.2 In addition, as early as 1968 opinion
polls showed that over 75 percent of the Indian public was in favor
of making the decision to go nuclear. 3 In view of these facts, the
expenditure of $400,000 must be regarded as a conscious national
decision to pursue the possible benefits of nuclear explosive devices.
However the logic of the decision may be criticized, the legality of the
act in regard to humanitarian principles of international law cannot
be questioned.
III. THE INDIAN POSITION
India's defense of its nuclear explosion is based on three argu-
ments: 1) the Non-Proliferation Treaty is discriminatory and there-
fore has no legal effect on states not a party to that treaty, 2) the
61. For a good sampling of this attitude in the American press, see AMERICAN
MEDIA AND INDIA'S BOMB, a series of six pamphlets published by the Embassy of Paki-
stan.
62. Press Release No. 8/74, supra note 51, at 7-8. The figure of $400,000 reflects
only the cost of building the explosive device. The research and development was a
"free spin-off" of the Indian nuclear power program. The hole for the nuclear device
was dug by hand. Malloy, Critical for the Masses, The National Observer, August 24,
1974, at 16, col. 2.
63. Kapur, supra note 20, at 381.
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Indian nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only, and 3) India,
as a matter of self-defense, has a right to retain a military option in
conjunction with its nuclear program. 4 Each of these points will be
discussed in turn.
A. Discriminatory Nature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
It has been a long-standing position of the Indian government
that any nuclear non-proliferation treaty must embody an acceptable
balance of mutual obligations between the nuclear and non-nuclear
powers, be a step toward the achievement of general and complete
disarmament, and be void of any loopholes which might permit nu-
clear or non-nuclear powers to proliferate nuclear weapons in any
form. 15 In the Indian view, the Non-Proliferation Treaty is discrimi-
natory because it fails to meet any of the three requirements.
Concerning the mutuality of obligations, India's greatest objec-
tions are to the international controls over the peaceful nuclear pro-
grams of the non-nuclear weapon states." The objection is merely one
in a long line of Indian objections to any system of international
nuclear controls that does not encompass all countries, including
nuclear weapon states . 7 India opposed the formation of the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency and has consistently attempted to
make its own nuclear program as independent as possible from for-
eign assistance and safeguard measures. This attitude is reflected
in India's preference for loose bilateral agreements concerning nu-
clear foreign aid. 9
Also, the vast amount of inspection experience is in the West.70
The emerging nations of the third world are distrustful of such agen-
cies as the International Atomic Energy Agency which might easily
be dominated by inspectors from the developed countries. 7' In addi-
tion, keeping the proper records and maintaining nuclear facilities in
such a manner that inspections can be thorough and effective are very
costly to the host nation." The cost of the safeguard program is not
dealt with directly in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and therefore pro-
64. See S. WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 45.
65. These provisions are part of G.A. Res. 2028, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 7-8,
U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965). Prime Minister Gandhi has stated that the Non-Proliferation
Treaty is unacceptable to India because it does not conform to the mandate of Resolu-
tion 2028. S. WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 44.
66. Sullivan, supra note 50, at 355-56.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 356-58.
69. Id.; S. WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 61.
70. Questor, supra note 12, at 167.
71. Id. at 165.
72. Id. at 164-65.
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vides a legitimate cause for concern among nations such as India that
are trying to develop their nuclear industries as quickly as possible.
A second aspect of the mutuality of obligations problem is that
the Non-Proliferation Treaty imposes a policy of non-armament on
the non-nuclear weapon states while allowing nuclear weapon states
to continue the arms race.73 From the Indian viewpoint, the provi-
sions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty concerning disarmament by the
nuclear weapon states are too vague to be considered a quid pro quo
for India's relinquishment of its nuclear option." It is the Indian
position that for a disarmament provision to be effective it must have
a specific time limit within which all nuclear weapon proliferation
will be halted. The wording of the provision must be sufficiently clear
to create a definite juridical obligation for the nuclear weapon
states. 5 In this respect, the Indian position inextricably links nuclear
non-proliferation with disarmament on the part of the nuclear
weapon states. 6
B. Peaceful Nuclear Explosive Devices
The second major Indian objection to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty is the treaty's failure to distinguish between peaceful nuclear
explosive devices and nuclear weapons.7 7 India views the failure as an
attempt by the nuclear weapon states to extend their monopoly on
nuclear weaponry to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy."8 At the
present time, peaceful nuclear explosives are still experimental.79 Ar-
ticle V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which guarantees that nuclear
explosive devices for peaceful purposes will be made available to non-
nuclear weapon states could be thwarted simply by the foot-dragging
of the nuclear weapon states in the area of nuclear explosives re-
search. In effect, the non-nuclear weapon states' access to the possi-
ble benefits of peaceful nuclear explosives would be dependent upon
the willingness of the nuclear weapon states to allocate funds for
nuclear explosives research. 0 This type of technological subservience
73. Sullivan, supra note 50, at 366; S. WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 50.
74. S. WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 46-48.
75. Id. at 47-48.
76. Id. at 46. India's disarmament proposal includes 1) a comprehensive test ban
treaty that provides for the international control of peaceful nuclear explosives, 2) a
freeze on the production of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and 3) a
reduction in existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Id.; Press Release No. 8/74, supra
note 51, at 6-7.
77. STOCKHOLM PEACE INSTITUTE, supra note 19, at 21; S. WILLIAMS, supra note 19,
at 57-60. See also note 6, supra.
78. S. WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 59.
79. Brooks & Myers, Plowshare Evaluation, in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: PROSPECTS
FOR CONTROL 87, 101 (B. Boskey & M. Willrich ed. 1970).
80. G. FiscHER, supra note 30, at 117-18.
1974
250 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
is particularly distasteful to nations such as India, which have al-
ready developed an advanced nuclear industry."'
The Indian position on the distinction between peaceful nuclear
explosives and nuclear weapons has been joined by several other non-
nuclear weapon states." In their view, the use of nuclear energy for
economic development is an inalienable right.83 Any derogation of
this right, therefore, must be non-discriminatory in order to have the
force of customary international law.
C. Nuclear Military Option
The third Indian objection to the Non-Proliferation Treaty is
that there are inadequate security guarantees for the non-nuclear
weapon states.84 Because of India's insistence that its nuclear pro-
gram is for exclusively peaceful purposes, the objection is rarely
raised in connection with India's refusal to sign the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. Nevertheless, national security considerations have played
an increasingly greater role in decisions concerning India's nuclear
development. 5
The problem of security guarantees for the non-nuclear weapon
states was recognized at an early stage in the negotiations on the
Non-Proliferation Treaty." The United States successfully resisted
incorporation of security guarantees into the treaty itself.87 To remedy
the deficiency, the Security Council passed the following resolution
on June 19, 1968:
The Security Council,
Noting with appreciation the desire of a large number of States to
81. Sullivan, supra note 50, at 355. In assessing this attitude it must be remem-
bered that India views nuclear energy as the key to its economic development. See
India News, June 7, 1974, at 1, col. 1; Malloy, supra note 62, at 16, col. 1. The energy
crisis has hit India particularly hard. See Malloy supra note 62, at 1, col. 2; Crippling
Shortage, TIME, April 29, 1974, at 88; Press Release No. 8/74, supra note 51, at 7.
82. Comment, Non-Proliferation Treaty and Peaceful Applications of Nuclear
Explosives, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1030, 1031 (1968).
83. See the Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States,
Resolution J in U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 35/10,at 16-17. The Treaty of Tlatelolco also makes
a distinction between nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices as long as these
devices are under strict international control. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 28, art.
XVIII.
84. See generally, Kapur, supra note 20; Kapur, Peace and Power in India's Nu-
clear Policy, 10 ASIAN SURVEY 779 (1970); S. WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 50-56; Coffey,
Nuclear Guarantees and Non-Proliferation, 25 INr'L ORG. 836 (1971); Coffey, Threat,
Reassurance, and Nuclear Proliferation in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: PROSPEcTS FOR
CONTROL, supra note 79, at 119.
85. Sullivan, supra note 50, at 369; Kapur, supra note 20, at 381; Kapur, supra
note 84, at 783-784; NEWSWEEK, supra note 52, at 42.
86. M. WiuaLicH, supra note 6, at 166-67.
87. Id. at 167.
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subscribe to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
and thereby to undertake not to receive the transfer from any transferor
whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices di-
rectly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any
assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explo-
sive devices,
Taking into consideration the concern of certain of these States that,
in conjunction with their adherence to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, appropriate measures be undertaken
to safeguard their security,
Bearing in mind that any aggression accompanied by the use of
nuclear weapons would endanger the peace and security of all States,
1. Recognizes that aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of
such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a situa-
tion in which the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon
State permanent members, would have to act immediately in accordance
with their obligations under the United Nations Charter;
2. Welcomes the intention expressed by certain States that they will
provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter,
to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act or an object
of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used;
3. Reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recognized under Arti-
cle 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security."
India immediately rejected the resolution as being nothing more
than a restatement of the nuclear weapon states' obligations under
the U.N. Charter." As such, it does not constitute a reasonable quid
pro quo for a non-nuclear weapon state's renunciation of nuclear
weapons.9 0 Also, the resolution is so ambiguous that it is almost use-
less as an effective legal obligation. It does not, for instance, define
aggression or the threat of aggression." It does not assure immediate
action, since the guarantees are to be enforced through the mecha-
nism of the Security Council.2
88. S/Res./255, 23 U.N. SCOR 1430th meeting in U.N. Doc. S/PV 1430 (1968).
89. S. WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 44; Coffey, Nuclear Guarantees and Non-
Proliferation, supra note 84, at 837.
90. S. WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 44.
91. Lenefsky, U.N. Security Council Resolution on Security Assurances for Non-
Nuclear Weapon States, 3 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POLITIcs 56, 61 (1970). The recent U.N.
paragraph defining aggression may remedy the deficiency.
92. Id. at 62-63. The point is particularly relevant since China became a perma-
nent member of the Security Council. China could prevent the Security Council from
taking any action in a dispute between itself and India through the use of its veto
power.
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The inadequacies of the resolution, coupled with the inability of
India to obtain effective unilateral guarantees, 3 has placed India in
a precarious military situation. India is flanked by two hostile neigh-
bors, Pakistan and the People's Republic of China. Indian military
planners regard Pakistan as a significant but short term threat. 4
From the Indian point of view, the most disturbing aspect of the
Pakistani threat is that nation's membership in SEATO. 5 The In-
dian concern was shown to be justified by the United States support
of Pakistan during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war.
The long term threat to Indian security is posed by China. 6
China has the ideology and the military capability to seriously
threaten the independence of India. The war between India and
China in 1962, Chinese nuclear development since 1964, and Chinese
support of Pakistan have caused India to re-evaluate its position with
respect to a nuclear weapons program. 7 Fear of Chinese nuclear
blackmail and the probability that within a short time India will have
fallen far behind China in the development of nuclear explosives have
gradually increased pressure upon the Indian government to make
the decision to go nuclear." Indeed, an opinion poll conducted after
the Indian nuclear blast indicates that almost two-thirds of the edu-
cated Indian populace want to use India's nuclear technology to man-
ufacture nuclear weapons.9 It is also interesting to note that India has
been developing a modest space program in recent years.' °° The tech-
nology from the space program could be used as a basis for developing
a nuclear weapons delivery system.10' In view of the fact that the
feasible use of peaceful nuclear explosives is probably many years
away, 02 it must be concluded that Indian technological development
has been designed to give India an effective nuclear military option
that can be utilized in a relatively short period of time. India's neigh-
bors are justified in regarding India's nuclear blast with suspicion,
despite the pronouncements of Prime Minister Gandhi. 03
93. Noorani, India's Quest for a Nuclear Guarantee, 7 ASIAN SURVEY 490 (1967).
94. Kapur, supra note 84, at 784.
95. W. Wentz, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 97-98 (1968).
96. Kapur, supra note 84, at 784; Kapur, supra note 20, at 382; W. Wentz, supra
note 95, at 97.
97. Kapur, supra note 20, at 381.
98. STOCKHOLM PEACE INSTITUTE, supra note 19, at 21; Kapur, supra note 20, at
380-381.
99. Rocky Mountain News, Aug. 3, 1974, at 38, col. 4.
100. STOCKHOLM PEACE INSTITUTE, supra note 19, at 19; India News, July 5, 1974,
at 5; Malloy, supra note 62, at 16, col. 6.
101. Malloy, supra note 62, at 16, col. 6.
102. Brooks & Myers, supra note 79, at 101.
103. Pakistan regards the verbal assurances of the Indian government as
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
A. Legality of Indian Development of Nuclear Explosive Devices
There is substantial evidence of a slowly developing norm
against nuclear proliferation. Prior to the enactment of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, significant steps had been taken toward the
creation of nuclear free zones and against the indiscriminate testing
of nuclear explosive devices. The Non-Proliferation Treaty itself has
received a wide measure of support, both through formal ratifications
and state practice. The provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
must be presumptively considered as part of customary international
law.'" The legality of India's actions, therefore, rests on the validity
of its objections to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The objection to the discriminatory nature of the treaty is well
founded. The Non-Proliferation Treaty places no burden whatsoever
upon the nuclear weapon states. The United States and the Soviet
Union never had any intention of transferring nuclear weaponry to
other nations. 0 5 Also, the ineffectiveness of the treaty's provisions on
disarmament have been demonstrated by the failure of the nuclear
weapon states to achieve meaningful progress in the area of arms
control. There is no adequate compensation given to the non-nuclear
weapon states by the treaty for the obligations which they are re-
quired to undertake.0 6 As a result, the control provisions of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty cannot be considered a part of customary inter-
national law. The requirements are violative of a basic, peremptory
norm of international law that all nations are equal in the interna-
tional legal system.07 A conclusion to the contrary would institution-
alize in juridical form the inherent inequality between the nuclear
weapon states and the non-nuclear weapon states.
The objection to the Non-Proliferation Treaty's failure to distin-
unpersuasive of that country's peaceful intentions. See 27 PAKISTAN AFFAIRS No. 12,
supra note 1, at 1. In the Pakistani view, "it is a question not only of intentions but of
capabilities." Press Release, Embassy of Pakistan, text of the reply of the Prime
Minister of Pakistan to the letter of the Prime Minister of India, June 5, 1974, at 1.
104. Baxter, supra note 14, at 290, 299. The Non-Proliferation Treaty is both
declaratory of existing customary international law and legislative in that it adds to
the law of nuclear non-proliferation. The writer has chosen to treat the Non-
Proliferation Treaty as presumptively representative of customary international law
(ie., as a declaratory treaty) because it is for the most part a continuation and exten-
sion of previous efforts in the area of nuclear non-proliferation.
105. G. FISCHER, supra note 30, at 67.
106. Sullivan, supra note 50, at 369.
107. The concept that any non-proliferation treaty must respect the sovereign
equality of the non-nuclear weapon states was articulated in Resolution A of the
Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States, supra note 83, at 5-6.
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guish between peaceful nuclear explosives and nuclear weapons is not
convincing. It is a simple technological fact that there is no difference
between such a device and a bomb.08 Nuclear capability is just as
destabilizing as actual possession of nuclear weapons. 09 It must be
concluded that a non-discriminatory non-proliferation treaty which
placed all nuclear explosive devices under international control
would be binding upon states not a party to that treaty.
However, it must also be concluded that India's objection to the
nuclear weapon states' monopoly on nuclear explosives is valid.
Given the right of states to use nuclear energy for economic develop-
ment, any restriction on the use of nuclear explosives must be univer-
sal in order to have binding legal effect."'
The most important objection to the Non-Proliferation Treaty is
the one based on national security grounds. The basis of the objection
lies in the Indian desire to retain a military nuclear option. The
argument, therefore, does not challenge the narrow discriminatory
provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty but rather confronts the
assertion that there exists a general international legal norm against
the development of nuclear weapons. It does not apply to the recent
Indian nuclear explosion, which was for allegedly peaceful purposes.
Instead, it is limited to the possibility that India may some day make
the decision to develop nuclear weaponry."'
It is a peremptory norm of international law that all nations have
the right of self-defense." 2 No multi-lateral treaty, therefore, which
leaves a state not a party to that treaty bereft of reasonable security
guarantees can be legally binding upon that state. The security guar-
antees accompanying the Non-Proliferation Treaty are inadequate
with respect to such states as India."3 Also, after a reasonable at-
tempt, India found that it could not obtain satisfactory unilateral
guarantees without sacrificing its non-aligned status.", There can be
no doubt that China represents a legitimate nuclear threat to India."'
Given the military situation in which India finds itself today, India
108. See note 6, supra.
109. See note 97, supra. The maxim that the threat is often more powerful than
its execution is quite applicable to this situation.
110. See note 83, supra.
111. In concluding that states not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty have
the right, as of the present time, to develop peaceful nuclear explosives as their eco-
nomic needs warrant, the writer has limited the argument to nuclear weapons only.
112. U.N. Charter art. LI.
113. Pakistan also considers the security guarantees embodied in the Security
Council resolution inadequate. 27 PAKISTAN AFFAIRS No. 12, supra note 1, at 4.
114. See Noorani, supra note 93.
115. S. WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 29; W. Wentz, supra note 95, at 97.
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would be justified under present standards of international law in
building a nuclear weapons force designed to counter the Chinese
threat."'
B. Legal Impact Upon Pakistan
It is the saddest and most dangerous aspect of nuclear prolifera-
tion that the acquisition of nuclear capability by one state, even for
legitimate reasons, leads inevitably to the need of another nation to
acquire that same capability. Just as India was pressured to go nu-
clear by the Chinese nuclear development, so too is Pakistan now
being pressured to explore a nuclear option.
Pakistan, however, has a much less developed nuclear industry
than India."17 As a consequence, Pakistan has taken a positive atti-
tude toward the Non-Proliferation Treaty" ' (although it is not a party
to the treaty) and has actively sought security assurances from the
United States and China." 9 Given Pakistan's membership in
CENTO and SEATO, and its cordial relationship with the United
States and China, the security assurances of these two countries
against Indian nuclear aggression should be adequate at the present
time. Nevertheless, by applying the same rationale to Pakistan as
was applied to India in the above arguments, it is difficult to see how
Pakistan can be legally restrained from developing a nuclear explo-
sive device. In view of India's hostile attitude toward Pakistan in the
past thirty years, Pakistan would be legally justified in maintaining
nuclear parity with India.
C. Future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
The Non-Proliferation Treaty does not represent customary in-
ternational law to such an extent that its provisions are binding upon
states not a party to that treaty. The reason for this unhappy result
probably lies in the fact that the concept of non-proliferation cuts
across the conflicting political and economic goals of the nations of
the world. Translated into legal terms, the Non-Proliferation Treaty
as it is now constituted is basically incompatible with two peremp-
tory norms of international law: the equality of states in the interna-
tional legal system and the inherent right of self-defense. If the Non-
Proliferation Treaty were made to work it would in effect create a two
tiered international system in which there would be no movement
between the two levels. 1 The handful of nuclear weapon states would
116. See Coffey, Nuclear Guarantees and Non-Proliferation, supra note 84, at 844.
117. STOCKHOLM PEACE INSTITUTE, supra note 19, at 25-26.
118. Id. at 26.
119. Id. at 25. See also 27 PAKISTAN AFFAIRS No. 12, supra note 1, at 4; Id., No.
13, at 3.
120. Sullivan, supra note 45, at 366.
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dominate the entire system. In view of Secretary of State Kissinger's
recent successes in Moscow and Peking, such a possibility is not so
far-fetched in the eyes of the third world. In this scenario the Non-
Proliferation Treaty would work because the basic international legal
concept of the equality of states would be discarded in favor of a legal
system that reflected and legitimized the political, economic, and
military inequality of states in the late 1960's.
A second alternative would be complete and total disarmament
in regard to nuclear weapons. In this way a new legal norm of nuclear
non-proliferation could be formulated. The norm would be binding
upon all states in that it would be universal in application and would
eliminate the need for security assurances. In contrast with the first
alternative, military reality would be changed so as to allow the Non-
Proliferation Treaty to function within the peremptory norms of state
equality and national self-defense.
A final alternative would be the development of multilateral
regional nuclear forces throughout the world."' The need for general
disarmament by the nuclear powers would be eliminated and at the
same time credible security assurances would be available to all the
non-nuclear weapon states. International stability would be en-
hanced in that the number of nuclear actors would remain low and
relatively constant.
Since none of the above alternatives are likely to come about in
the near future, it must be concluded that nuclear non-proliferation
is a problem that will be handled within the political arena. 22 Inter-
national law and the system of nuclear weapons control put forth in
the Non-Proliferation Treaty are basically incompatible. The preven-
tion of nuclear proliferation will, for the foreseeable future, depend
upon the ability of our political leaders to find a just and equitable
solution to this problem.
James R. Walczak
121. Kahn & Dibble, Criteria for Long Range Nuclear Control Policies, 55 CAL.
L. REV. 473, 479-81 (1967).
122. For other predictions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty's fate see Kaplan,
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Its Rationale, Prospects, and Possible Impact on
International Law, 18 J. PUB. L. 1, 10 (1969); Kahn, supra note 121, at 479.
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